SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, CIVIL PART MIDDLESEX COUNTY

DOCKET NOS. MID-L-001217-15

MID-L-001938-15

MID-L-001939-15

MID-L-001951-15

MID-L-002022-15

APP. DIV. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

MIDDLESEX COUNTY
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE,

Plaintiff,

v.

NJ ADVANCE MEDIA and HOME NEWS TRIBUNE,

Defendants. :

HOME NEWS TRIBUNE,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIDDLESEX COUNTY
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE,

Defendant.

RICHARD RIVERA,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIDDLESEX COUNTY : PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, et al.,:

Defendants. :

COLLENE WRONKO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIDDLESEX COUNTY : PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, et al.,:

Defendants. :

TRANSCRIPT

 $\mathsf{OF}$ 

MOTION HEARING

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, CIVIL PART

MIDDLESEX COUNTY

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MID-L-001951-15

MID-L-002022-15

APP. DIV. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

NJ ADVANCE MEDIA, LLC,

Plaintiff,

TRANSCRIPT

v.

OF

MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE and

JAMES E. O'NEILL,

MOTION HEARING

Defendants.

Place: Middlesex County Courthouse

56 Paterson Street

New Brunswick, NJ 08903

Date: June 10, 2015

#### BEFORE:

HONORABLE TRAVIS L. FRANCIS, A.J.S.C.

#### TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:

BENJAMIN D. LEIBOWITZ, ESQ. (Senior Deputy Middlesex County Counsel)

### APPEARANCES:

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(Hearing commenced at 9:09 a.m.)
THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. Please be seated.

Okay. We're on the record and the Court is hearing argument this morning with respect to the following cases: Richard Rivera versus Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office; Collene Wronko versus The Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office, et al., Docket L-1939-15 and L-1951-15, respectively.

The Court is also hearing limited argument with respect to the <u>Vaughn</u> index that was previously provided in the matters of Home News Tribune versus Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office, Docket L-1938-15, New Jersey Advance Media versus Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office, Docket L-2022-15, and Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office versus New Jersey Advance Media, Docket L-1217-15. And that is as it relates to the motion for a protective order.

Now, I'd like to start with Rivera versus the Prosecutor's Office and Wronko versus the Prosecutor's Office.

Would counsel please put all of your appearances on the record first?

MS. GRIFFIN: Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. GRIFFIN: C.J. Griffin of the law firm Pashman Stein for plaintiff Richard Rivera and plaintiff Collene Wronko.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MILLER: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. MILLER: Keith Miller from the firm of Robinson Miller, Newark, New Jersey, on behalf of New Jersey Advance Media in the L-2022-15 case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. LOWY: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. LOWY: Nomi Lowy on behalf of the Home News Tribune in the Home News Tribune versus Middlesex County case and Middlesex County versus Home News Tribune case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. CAFFERTY: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Hi.

MR. CAFFERTY: Thomas Cafferty, Gibbons, P.C., in the same case as Ms. Lowy. She's my associate counsel.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Hi.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Benjamin D. Leibowitz, Senior Deputy Middlesex County Counsel, appearing on the limited basis of one issue that relates to the prosecutor's order for protective -- for protection on L-1212-15 [sic].

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.
MR. HARRIOTT: Good morning, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Hi.

MR. HARRIOTT: Christopher Harriott from the firm of Florio and Kenny appearing on behalf of the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office on all five of the matters that are before Your Honor this morning.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, counsel.

Now, with regard to the Rivera and Wronko matters, I am going to summarize what was reviewed in your respective briefs and then I'll give you the opportunity to enhance those arguments. But I ask you please not to repeat what I've already placed on the record.

Now, the plaintiffs Collene Wronko and Richard Rivera seek insight into the shooting of a Talbot Schroeder on January 14, 2015 in Old Bridge and submitted various OPRA requests to the township of Old Bridge and the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office.

The township of Old Bridge deferred to the

Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office in responding to those requests. And the Prosecutor's Office provided access to some record and denied access to others.

Now, Mr. Rivera requested the following, and I will also give you the Prosecutor's Office response to each of those requests:

One. "All standard operating procedures and policies currently in effect, except for those with security exemptions, including each date of adoption and authorization to implement."

The Prosecutor's Office responded: "Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, et seq., standard operating procedures and policies detail various police procedures, provide instruction to police officers and are matters of security. If released to the public, it would pose a security threat to law enforcement and the public. As such, the request must be denied."

Number two. "Internal Affairs' annual summary reports for 2006 through 2014, including all tables and executive summaries."

That request was complied with.

Number three. "Police use of force incident reports for January 14, 2015."

That request was also complied with.

Number four. "All police use of force reports for January 14, 2015."

That was complied with

That was complied with.

Number five. "Computer-aided dispatching or CAD summary log or similar police report for activities on January 14, 2015 relating to the shooting death of Talbot Schroeder of Cedar Grove Place."

The response was: "While a CAD report was created as a result of this incident, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, et seq. allows for the withholding of a document that is considered part of a criminal investigatory record, serves as an intra-departmental memo within a law enforcement agency and also is exempt as a security measure that, if released to the public, could pose a threat to the safety of law enforcement and the public."

Number six. "Computer-aided dispatch and CAD abstract event reports or similar police report or activities on January 14, 2015 relating to the shooting death of Mr. Schroeder."

The response by the Prosecutor's Office was essentially the same, again relying on 47:1A-1.

Number seven. "Investigation reports, narratives, supplemental reports, special reports,

incident reports, and arrest reports relating to the January 14, 2015 shooting of Mr. Schroeder containing information as to the identity of the investigating and arresting personnel and the information of the circumstances immediately surrounding the arrest, including, but not limited to, the time and place of the arrest, resistance, if any, pursuit, possession and nature and use of weapon and ammunition by the suspect and the police."

The Prosecutor's Office again responded with a response relying on the language contained within N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, et seq.

Item eight. "Police daily log -- daily duty log for January 14, 2015 relating to the shooting death of Mr. Schroeder, including all police officers, supervisors and civilians working during that time and what their assignments were, including directed patrol. There are no security exemptions here, in that the material sought is historical and police officers, except those in an undercover capacity, and known to the public."

The Prosecutor's Office responded with a similar response, again relying on the language contained within N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, et seq.

Number nine. "All police radio recordings

for January 14, 2015 relating to the shooting death of Mr. Schroeder for all police frequencies and channels."

Again the response was relying on the aforementioned statute.

"All police telephone Number ten. recordings on January 14, 2015 relating to the death -or the shooting death of Mr. Schroeder."

Again reliance on the same statute.

"All 9-1-1 telephone calls on Number 11. January 14, 2015 relating to the shooting death."

"Although there was a The response was: 9-1-1 call made to the Old Bridge Police Department on January 14, 2015 concerning this incident, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 allows for the withholding of a document or recording in which a family or victim has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Additionally, Governor's Executive Order 69, which is incorporated into the aforementioned statute, prohibits the release of the identity of witnesses and victims in instances in which no arrests have been made, as in the case in this incident. Therefore, this portion of the request must be denied."

"All police telephone call logs Number 12. on January 14, 2015 relating to the shooting."

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Again reliance by the Prosecutor's Office on the aforementioned statute.

And number 13. "Mobile transmission data, in-car terminals, messages and transmissions to and from all terminals on January 14, 2015 relating to the shooting."

Again reliance on the aforementioned statute.

"Copies of requests for Number 14. materials and records made by other persons and entities seeking records for the January 14, 2015 police incident involving the shooting of Mr. Schroeder."

That request was complied with. However, it was complied with after the initiation of the lawsuit.

"Copies of subpoenas seeking And item 15. records generated or spawned by the police department on January 14, 2015 relating to the death of Mr. Schroeder."

And again the Prosecutor's Office responded relying on the aforementioned N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.

Now, the Wronko request was similar, and there were seven specific requests made by Wronko. "Copies of all 9-1-1 calls for 40

Cedar Grove Place."

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The response to the Wronko request was similar in -- basically, in all respects to the response that the Prosecutor's Office gave to the Rivera request, relying on 47:1A-1 and the Governor's Executive Order 69 for denying the request.

With respect to item two of the Wronko request -- "copies of all police dispatch reports for 40 Cedar Grove Place in Old Bridge -- again, the request was denied, relying on the aforementioned statute.

"Copies of all CAD reports." Number three. And the response noted that while a CAD report was created as a result of the incident, again, relying on 47:1A-1, the same was denied.

Request number four. "Copies of incident reports for Cedar Grove Place for January 14, 2015." That request was complied with.

"Copies of use of force reports for the aforementioned address on the same date."

Also complied with. "Copies of Attorney General deadly notification report for 40 Cedar Grove Place for

January 14, 2015." "This two page document The response was: will be forwarded to you in a separate e-mail.

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police narrative on the second page of the document is considered part of a criminal investigatory record and has been redacted." And again a citation to 47:1A-1. And then, finally: "Copies of Internal

Affairs police."

And the response was that the request was unclear and, therefore, they were unable to proceed with regard to the same.

Now, plaintiffs, specifically Rivera, argues that the Court must determine whether the records requested are government records and whether an exemption applies. And that's the standard clearly that the Court must apply in any case involving a request for public records.

And the plaintiff asserts that, because all of the requested records were made by police officers during their official course of business, they are government records within the purview of the statute. And plaintiff contends that the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office violated the Open Public Records Act by denying access to the 9-1-1 call recordings, the computer-aided dispatch, the CAD reports, police telephone recordings and police telephone call logs, as set forth in items five, six and ten of plaintiff's OPRA request.

The defendant stated that they could not release those records, because they are criminal investigatory records and not subject to OPRA.

The plaintiff sought access to the 9-1-1 tape in item 11 of plaintiff's request. Plaintiff argues that OPRA's privacy provision can only exclude a 9-1-1 tape from access in a very limited circumstance and the plaintiff does not believe that the burden has been met.

For request number one, the plaintiff argues that the Prosecutor's Office denied access to the records under the security exemption to OPRA and plaintiff's request specifically stated, quote, "except those with security exemptions," end of quote. Therefore, the plaintiff has requested that the Court compel the defendants to release those that are not exempt and to produce a log of those records withheld in accordance with <a href="#Paff">Paff</a>. And that <a href="Paff">Paff</a> versus New Jersey Department of Labor at 392 <a href="Super">Super</a>. 334, a 2007 Appellate Division case.

The plaintiff did not address in their brief items seven, eight, nine and 13, and these items were all denied by the defendant as well.

The plaintiff is also seeking judgments against the Old Bridge Police Department that, at

least in their words, co-opted the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office responses.

The -- in the Wronko matter, plaintiffs essentially assert the same arguments as are asserted in the Rivera matter with respect to those items that were denied by the Prosecutor's Office.

The opposition relies in no small part on MAG Entertainment versus The Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control at 375 Super. 534, a 2005 Appellate Division case.

The defendant asserts that a records custodian is not required to conduct open-ended searches of the agency's files or to analyze, compile and collate the information contained in the agency's files in an effort to locate information that is the The defendants contend that subject of a request. there is not any particular document sought. defendant avers that the request fails to reasonably identify any specific governmental records sought, but instead requests information or a category of documents, which the custodian cannot comply without conducting a search of their files. And the defendants assert that the documents sought do not specify from which department said records are requested.

Now, the Court would note that the requests were really bifurcated. The requests were made to the Prosecutor's Office, as well as to the Old Bridge Police Department. The Old Bridge Police Department then essentially relied on the Prosecutor's Office to respond to those items that related to them.

With regard to requests five, six, seven, nine, ten and 13, defendants submit that the same were properly withheld as criminal investigatory records. The defendants contend that there is a continuing investigation into the circumstances surrounding this police shooting and, therefore, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 excludes criminal investigatory records from release under OPRA.

Now, counsel, I will hear your arguments with respect to your specific requests, then I'd like to hear from Mr. Cafferty and counsel with respect to the <u>Vaughn</u> index that was provided, and then I'll hear any additional argument that may have been asserted by counsel for the defense, not only in response to plaintiffs' arguments, but in support of your application for the protective order. Okay? All right.

MS. GRIFFIN: Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. GRIFFIN: I suppose I want to start by saying I feel a little bit like the stepchild here, because I arrived today, I wasn't aware that the other attorneys would be here on the other motion, and actually my clients were never notified that there was a protective order being argued or we did not know its existence.

We also did not know that they were -- that the other attorneys were given a <u>Vaughn</u> index. We have not been given that <u>Vaughn</u> index. So I did make an argument in my reply brief that I have no clue what they've even redacted from the 9-1-1 call, because it's not evident to me and there was no index or, you know, no <u>Vaughn</u> index.

And then I also am sort of in the dark, because repeatedly throughout both of the briefs in opposition to the orders to show cause, defendants make reference to the certification that was supported in -- that was submitted in support of the motion for a protective order. Which, again, I haven't seen.

So I don't see how defendants can meet their burden of proof in my two cases when they have completely kept us in the dark. I am not sure if it's inadvertent, I'm not sure if it's because media entities tend to get a little bit more deference in

public records cases and often individual requestors are seen as gadflies or pains.

In this particular case, Mr. Rivera made this request on behalf of the Latino Leadership Alliance. He is a scholar on police affairs. He has authored reports for the ACLU. This organization has a civil rights project and they're particular inter --particularly interested in police shootings. So whenever there is a police shooting in the -- of a citizen in this state, Mr. Rivera makes a request for all -- for these same types of records.

THE COURT: Okay, but those types of bona fides are not prerequisites for an OPRA request.

MS. GRIFFIN: They are. They aren't. I -- but they do come into play when you are invoking privacy exemptions and you have to --

THE COURT: Correct.

MS. GRIFFIN: -- do a <u>Burnett</u> analysis.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm. Okay.

MS. GRIFFIN: But I suppose I'm making the point that, you know, again, that I feel a little bit like the stepchild in this. That we're completely in the dark. And I don't see how, in our particular cases, the defendants have met their burden of proof as to those.

So I don't -- other than the general arguments that you've captured in terms of the 9-1-1 call, that it's not -- that -- and the CAD reports, that they're not criminal investigatory records by any means, and there's published case law that says that, and the 9-1-1 statute requires them to be made.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MS. GRIFFIN: I can't speak as to what was exactly redacted, because I don't know. I don't know what the <u>Vaughn</u> index said with regard to that. I haven't -- I've heard the redacted version. I don't -- I understand that Your Honor might have heard the full version. I am completely in the dark as to all of this.

In terms of the actual requests, I do want to clarify that for -- Your Honor did read the full request into the record, but Mr. Rivera is only suing on items one, which is the SOPs; five and six, which are the CAD reports; --

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MS. GRIFFIN: -- 11, which is the 9-1-1 call; and 14, which were the copies of the requests for records, which they did produce on April 30th.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. GRIFFIN: And Ms. Wronko is only suing

for items one, the 9-1-1 call, the police dispatch and CAD reports, and the narrative section of the Attorney It was redacted. General deadly notification report. She would at least like the Court to conduct an in That's not a criminal investigatory camera review. It's required by the state use -- Attorney record. General use of force policy to be made, just like use of force reports are. And O'Shea versus West Milford held that those are not CIRs and they cannot be withheld.

THE COURT: Right.

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So we think the redactions are MS GRIFFIN: unlawful.

In terms of, you know, based on what I've heard from other counsel here today, it appears that the Vaughn index revealed that there might only be one section of the call that relates to the actual victim that might invoke the privacy exemption. The other relates to just calls between police officers.

The defendants have made this argument in their brief that any record that might contain the name of a police officer could be withheld, because it could cause harm to the police officer. And I think -you know, I cited all the case law in my reply brief, but if you look at Courier News, that case expressly

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rejects any argument that would apply to every record and any argument that would apply to any record and keep it exempt for eternity.

There is no universal exemption. They have to prove in this particular record that releasing it would be harmful. And I don't see how they can do If you look at their language, for example, for the CAD reports they stated: "The CAD reports are likely to contain graphic and upsetting material." To meet their burden of proof, they have to actually tell us that the CAD report does that. They -- I am not certain it -- when I read this, it felt like counsel made arguments in a brief without having actually viewed the records, so I don't -- you know, they can't meet their burden of proof with this sort of speculation.

There is a case that came out last month, Gilleran versus The Township of Bloomfield. a case that I had argued and the Appellate Division really talked about this burden of proof. And when you just speculate what a record might contain and you don't even look at the record or watch the record or do anything to meet your burden of proof, the plaintiff wins. You can't meet your burden of proof

that way.

And the other thing regarding the officer safety is that they did release the use of force report forms with the off -- the name of the officer that fired his weapon in the report. So any mention of that officer in the CAD report or in the 9-1-1 call, it has already been disclosed, so I don't see any basis for withholding this record based on the fact that we already know the police officer involved.

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And finally, with regards to the SOPs, I think there's a clear distinction between MAG Entertainment and Bent and the cases that they cited. In those cases, the person requested the entire file for a certain project, which would contain various types of records within it. Here, he just requested the SOPs. It's clear that he requested them from the Prosecutor's Office and to Old Bridge, he requested them to Old Bridge, and Old Bridge actually gave him the SOPs, so obviously it didn't require research, it's easy to find.

It would be the -- the equivalent of me asking Your Honor for all canons of the Judicial Code of Conducts [sic]. You don't have to -- it -- I -- they're -- I think what they're ask -- what they're arguing is that he would have to say I want canon 7, and that would be a specific request. But here you

can request all of the SOPs. They're generally found in one location. He said expressly that he doesn't need the ones that are, you know, truly exempt under a security exemption, but he made the request for specific records which are SOPs.

As to the remainder, I -- you know, I would like some additional time after I hear the arguments about the <u>Vaughn</u> index, because I can't really comment on the 9-1-1 call until I actually am at least a little bit informed as to what has happened with it. But I do find it very troubling that a public agency would make a prot -- a motion for a protective order and argue that without even notifying all the parties that have requested the record and have filed suit on the record. And they have completely left my two clients in the dark as to these records.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, Keith Miller on

behalf of New Jersey Advance Media.

Just addressing the <u>Vaughn</u> index, to follow up on our hearing two weeks ago, we did receive what purports to be a <u>Vaughn</u> index from the Prosecutor's Office. It is certainly our position, as we set forth in our letter to the Court, that it is wholly

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It does not identify a single person by inadequate. name and nor does it identify a person by title or So, as of right now, we still don't have the slightest idea who the caller was, if there's a police officer's voice that's heard on here, if a dispatcher's voice is heard on here.

Also, we don't have the slightest idea who the purported victim is here. We still haven't heard and the Prosecutor's Office hasn't identified who the purported victim is here.

The only other record we have is the certification that was submitted by the prosecutor, Mr. Carey, back in, I think that was March or April, and that certification, as we argued the last time, is entirely devoid of any information. In fact, it says It was that members that he didn't even speak to it. of his office had contacted some unidentified family members who expressed concerns, but we don't know is the prosecutor Mr. Schroeder -- I mean, is the victim There's a reference apparently that Mr. Schroeder. there was a suicide attempt, but there was also I thought a reference to someone else might have been Is the So is the victim Mr. Schroeder? threatened. victim a family member that Mr. Schroeder might have Is the victim Mr. Schroeder when he been threatening?

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We don't have the slightest bit of

was apparently shot by a police officer?

information, and without this type of information, we can't possibly reach an evaluation of whether or not this -- there was information properly withheld under this privacy interest. Which, of course, as we have argued, has to be construed extremely narrowly. here the Prosecutor's Office is taking a very, very expansive interpretation of this privacy interest.

I would also note that we don't really have, you know, adequate information here, because the nature that this was presented, the record will reflect -- and, again, we argued this last time and I won't repeat it -- we had requested a <u>Vaughn</u> index quite a while ago once -- after the prosecutors had initially filed their protective order application. Which, again, I'm not going to reargue. We argued that the last time --

> THE COURT: Okay.

-- that it's entirely MR. MILLER: inappropriate, there's no basis for a protective order. I'm -- I'm not -- that's on the record already, but --

> THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MILLER: -- we had requested a <u>Vaughn</u>

index back then. We did not receive a Vaughn index. Then, apparently, once these lawsuits were started, the Prosecutor's Office presented the unredacted tape We did not consent to that. to Your Honor. Okay? And apparently Your Honor listened to that tape, which we didn't agree to or consent to. For the record, we learned that at the last hearing. We object to that, because that puts us in a very difficult situation where now we don't have an adequate Vaughn index.

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The prosecutor's position is, well, the judge has the tape, the judge can listen to the tape, the judge can figure out if it's right or wrong. would submit that's entirely contrary to the law of Vaughn and the <u>Vaughn</u> index. I said it in my brief, but that is not the way that it's supposed to go.

The whole point of the <u>Vaughn</u> index is to give specific information. And, again, we don't have The <u>Vaughn</u> index speaks for itself. it here. the Fisher case, the Appellate Division made clear that the point of the <u>Vaughn</u> is twofold. One of the purposes is to let the reviewing party, in this case Your Honor, you know, know why they're claiming exemptions. But the other equally important purpose is to let the requestor know what's being claimed as an exemption, so that the requestor can make a

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reasonable and informed argument to the Court. We are entirely unable to do that now,

because we -- like I said, we don't have any of the facts, so we can't possibly make this kind of informed argument. We are now put in a very difficult situation where our best alternative apparently is, But if we well, we can listen to the tape in camera. listen to the tape in camera, we can't discuss it with So I am not the requestor. My client is our clients. So if I listen to the tape, I can't the requestor. discuss it with my client, I can't talk about a legal strategy, I can't make informed arguments. I still -if I come out and argue before Your Honor, I can't say anything on the record that I might have heard back in there. So it puts me and my client in a very difficult situation, so --

You know, and this all started, again, with the improper protective order application, but it's compounded now. We've repeatedly asked for a proper <u>Vaughn</u> index. We have not received a proper <u>Vaughn</u> index.

And I would also note that in the Fisher case, the Appellate Division case -- which, again, I cited in my letter brief to Your Honor -- that relied on a case, a Ninth Circuit case called Wiener versus

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Which, again, we've cited. And in the Wiener case, you know, the court was clear about the reasons for an in camera review. And it says here:

"In camera review of the withheld documents by the court is not an acceptable substitute for In camera review does an adequate <u>Vaughn</u> index. not permit effective advocacy. Therefore, resort to in camera is appropriate only after the government has submitted as detailed public affidavits and testimony as possible."

And then I'm just going to jump in the cite "In camera review may supplement an adequate Vaughn index, but may not replace it."

And that's from 943 <u>F.2d</u> 972. That's a Ninth Circuit case cited with approval by our Appellate Division.

So I would submit that's the position we're We have not gotten an adequate <u>Vaughn</u> putting here. index, despite repeated requests, and we cannot be effective advocates here, because we don't even know, frankly, what we're arguing about.

I'd also just like to note very briefly an issue that was raised by the prosecutor when they submitted a reply brief to Your Honor a few days ago. Although, I would note Your Honor didn't call for

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reply briefs, but they put it in anyway. And they went back to Judge Serpentelli's opinion, which we had discussed last time in the Asbury Park Press case.

But, again, going back to Judge Serpentelli's opinion, Judge Serpentelli, even though in that case -- the only reported case where there was a finding of this privacy interest overcoming appellate's right -- in that case, even Judge Serpentelli said that the:

"Clearly, the court must always maintain a sharp focus on the purpose of OPRA and resist attempts to limits its scope absent a clear showing that one of the exemptions or exceptions incorporated by the statute by reference is applicable to the requested disclosure. salutary goal, simply put, is to maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process."

That's at 374 <u>N.J.Super.</u> 312 at 329. And then Judge Serpentelli, in distinguishing that said:

"However, having recognized the overarching value and objective of providing broad access to government records, the court must ask how the

release of the dying words of Anthony Napoleon in any way contributes to the purpose of OPRA or provides even a scintilla of insight into the functioning of government."

So that was the reason Judge Serpentelli

gives for saying I won't do that.

But here I would just note, Your Honor, that release -- public release of this tape will provide more than a scintilla of insight into the functioning of government. We have to remember here police officers showed up at Mr. Schroeder's house and apparently shot and killed him in the course of responding to a 9-1-1 call. Release of this tape will inform the public as to what happened here. There is a very strong public interest here. So I would just note that's a major difference where Judge Serpentelli

said there's absolutely nothing to be gained --THE COURT: There are clearly factual

distinctions.

MR. MILLER: Right, but --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MILLER: -- but I just wanted -- I just

wanted to point that out, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MILLER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CAFFERTY: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Hi.

MR. CAFFERTY: I'll try to be brief.

I want to start with the proposition, and I think it's true, procedure matters. And I think that there are several procedural steps that the Prosecutor's Office has taken in this case that has put both the plaintiffs and the Court in a very difficult situation. So let me briefly walk through those and relate them to the <u>Vaughn</u> index.

The first is -- counsel have already alluded to -- is the issue of this protective order. And counsel for the Prosecutor's Office this morning -- I suspect it was an oversight -- but he said, Your Honor, he's here to discuss the <u>Vaughn</u> index in the context of the protective order. I know the transmittal of the <u>Vaughn</u> index was in the context of all three, and so I am going to assume that it was.

But now addressing the <u>Vaughn</u> index in the context of the protective order. For all of the reasons that we previously argued, that protective order was procedurally improper. And the Cliff note version of that is there's at least six reasons why that protective order is procedurally improper and,

therefore, the <u>Vaughn</u> index should not be addressed, respectfully, in the context of that.

Number one. Under the <u>Rule</u> 4:10-3, protective orders apply to discovery matters in pending litigation. There was no pending litigation when that discovery order was filed.

Number two. There simply was no justiciable controversy when that protective order was filed. The protective order says I don't want to turn over this tape at all to the requestors.

THE COURT: In short, the statute gives the requestor the option to come to court, not the governmental entity.

MR. CAFFERTY: That's right, Judge. And that's quite apart from the procedural issues with respect to the rule. The statute gives it solely.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MR. CAFFERTY: And for good reason, because
the statute gives the requestor two distinct
fundamental rights: whether to litigate at all; -
THE COURT: Right.

MR. CAFFERTY: -- and, if so, where. The GRC or here.

THE COURT: Or here.

MR. CAFFERTY: Allowing a protective order

preemptively deprives the requestor of those two statutory rights and, candidly, circumvents ther enforcement mechanism of the act, which is the ability of a requestor who prevails to recover attorney fees, because there is no ability in a protective order under 4:42-9, which is the rule that deals with fee allocations or fee awards, that would allow the Court in that circumstances.

So, for all those reasons --

THE COURT: Yeah, but I take it you're arguing -- you would argue at some point with respect to your application for fees, assuming you're the prevailing party, that any work that was expanded on the protective order was within the context of the OPRA application.

MR. CAFFERTY: Well, my first argument -- again, because I think procedure matters -- is that we sent a 1:4-8 letter to the prosecutor --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. CAFFERTY: -- under when we got that protective order. So I think my first argument is, no, it's under the 1:4-8 rule, because there was no basis for it. And because I don't even want to contaminate it and argue it's an OPRA issue.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm. Okay.

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 MR. CAFFERTY: So -- so that's -- when we get to that point, that will be our --

THE COURT: Okay. And what I was essentially asserting though is that the protective order was spawned based on the OPRA application.

MR. CAFFERTY: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CAFFERTY: Yes. Right.

Now, so that deals with the procedural problems in the <u>Vaughn</u> index in the context of the protective order.

Now let's turn to the procedural problems of the <u>Vaughn</u> index in the context of our order to show cause.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CAFFERTY: And I think there is -- we start with the proposition -- and there has been a lot of, for lack of a better word, a cornucopia of reasons the prosecutor has advanced. And they have been moving targets throughout this litigation as to why the requestors aren't entitled to this tape. And, you know, we first start reasonable expectation of privacy, the Governor's Executive Order 69, and we go through multiple others. Criminal investigatory -- the Court knows and the Court has seen them --

criminal investigatory, advisory consultative and deliberative.

Now I believe all of that chaff is gone and the sole reason -- and I think this is important -- the sole reason now being asserted for the redactions in the <u>Vaughn</u> index are personal privacy. And so all of those other reasons that we had to respond to are no longer in play. So now let's turn to the sole reason in the redactions on the tape.

And I think the final procedural problem that the prosecutor has created for both the Court and for counsel -- and Mr. Miller alluded to it -- is transmitting the unredacted version to the Court and doing so without notice to counsel. So we weren't even in a position to be aware until the Court, candidly, told us on the record last time that the Court had the unredacted version.

Indeed, what's strange about the prosecutor doing that is his motion for the protective order seeks an order allowing him to send it to the Court. So he has preemptively granted himself the relief that his motion seeks. And that creates problems, because, as Mr. Miller correctly I think described, it -- a Vaughn index arises in the context of an assertion of privilege.

And I think the cases have clearly recognized that any viewing by a court of privileged material is a piercing of the privilege. Even an in camera viewing. And that's why the <u>Vaughn</u> index serves a role, not only for counsel, to assist counsel to effectively represent their clients' interest without piercing the privilege, but for the Court to determine is -- whether it's necessary to have an in camera viewing.

And so the <u>Vaughn</u> index we have here -- again, I won't repeat all our arguments, except to summarize a few of them to illustrate the problems with it -- just doesn't comply with what a <u>Vaughn</u> index should provide.

First counsel talks about Judge Serpentelli's case. And as we talked about last time, I was the attorney in that case. And that was a 2004 case, three years after OPRA. The issue in the case, as I said last time, was whether there was even a personal privacy exemption under OPRA. That was the question. And the argument in that case was whether 47:1A-1.1, which defines the legislative findings and talks about a personal expectation of reasonable expectation of personal privacy, created a substantive exemption under OPRA or was merely prefatory and not

substantive.

Judge Serpentelli did listen to the tape. My recollection of it is --

THE COURT: You would agree, however, that the remarks of Senator Robertson with respect to the legislation certainly could be reasonably interpreted to include a court's consideration of privacy interest.

MR. CAFFERTY: No question of -- yeah, that's what Judge Serpentelli held, --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CAFFERTY: -- but, you know, the prosecutor just seems to argue, because I didn't complain about a person, a <u>Vaughn</u> index in that case, I guess for the next 12 years and for however long I may be lucky to continue to practice law, I'm forever precluded from raising that issue. I don't think that's the law and shame on me perhaps for not doing that, but that doesn't mean that I don't learn by what happened in the past. And it's clear you should have a Vaughn index.

Let's turn again to a couple of examples of the redactions to -- which I think illustrate insufficiency of the <u>Vaughn</u> index. We -- the prosecutor has a redaction from 6:15 -- 6 minutes 15 seconds to 6 minutes 23 seconds and 6 minutes 26

seconds to 6 minutes and 30 seconds. And the basis for that is personal privacy, quote, "fleeing [sic] scream heard in the background."

Well, we don't know who -- what that fleeting scream was and, in fact, when you read the prosecutor's letter brief submitted with the <u>Vaughn</u> index to the Court on page 11 of it, I don't think the prosecutor even knows who is the individual screaming, because it says, "apart from the 9-1-1 responder on the call" -- and I'm reading from page 11 of the letter brief, point -- or Arabic number two -- "the other persons heard on the call or cited in the call on the redacted portions of the recording also are private citizens" -- and here's the operative -- "who appear to be household and family members of the caller."

So we don't even know who is ex -- who is uttering this fleeting scream, yet we were told -- we are told that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of that person. And I don't know -- it doesn't appear the tape identifies the person. As I said, the prosecutor doesn't even know who it is, so I don't know how leaving that scream in would invade somebody's reasonable expectation of privacy.

On 3 minutes 25 seconds to 3 minutes 27

seconds, the basis for that exemption is it constitutes a -- it contains a brief reference to the attempted suicide. Well, we all know that that's what this call involved. We know it, because it's in the news stories that are before the Court. We know it, because the prosecutor himself in his brief publicly filed in this case said it involved an attempted suicide. So I have difficulty with that.

And finally, the one that is difficult to respond to, because of deficiencies in the Vaughn index, but that is the from the zero point -- or colon zero zero to 2:53 minutes. Everything is redacted. And the one thing I suspect -- and this illustrates the over-redact, if there's such a word -- overredaction that occurred here, there's a regulation, N.J.A.C. 17:24-2.3(a)(5), which tells you and dictates how responders to the 9-1-1 calls are to answer the And it says: "All calls shall be answered with call. a response such as '9-1-1, where is the emergency.'" I mean, is that -- you know, that's redacted, apparently, under this. I can't imagine -- or either that or the responder, the person answering the call, disregarded the regulations, which is an important public issue, too. And I don't think that happened, but I think that brief comment is illustrative of the

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lack of support for redacting what's redacted here. And finally, to the extent there is a personal privacy in some of these comments on the tape, as Mr. Miller and Ms. Griffin referenced, when we get to the Burnett factors, at the end of the day the Court is weighing the personal privacy interest versus the public interest. This was a police It may be completely justified, involved shooting. but it certainly in today's day and age raises significant public interest and concern as to what happened to the 75-year-old disabled man in his home.

And that is not an insignificant public interest that I think, from what we can see from this <u>Vaughn</u> index, outweighs any of the assertions that have been advanced for personal privacy.

> Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

Thank you, Your Honor. MR. LEIBOWITZ:

It's our position that in an issue of privacy in this case, a <u>Vaughn</u> index itself violates the reasonable expectations of privacy that the private citizen callers on this call, made from the private residence of a citizen, involving a situation they had no control of, that was a personal situation. Not a cat stuck in the tree, come and get the cat out.

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Not a wire is down on the street, come and remove the wire.

But in the particular circumstances of this case, the individual's privacy is compelling and that the very demands of counsel that the Vaughn index was insufficient is not based upon privacy concerns, it's based upon distinguishable cases, documents that you can identify, that the person who wrote a letter, who received the letter, who got copies of a letter, the subject matter of the letter, and the grounds for the This is privilege. Attorney-client communication. completely different from the document cases, Your Honor.

And this is a novel case in this regard: it's a case of first instincts that we're presenting here that was not presented apparently in Serrano, that was not presented in the Ocean County Prosecutors case, that's presented here, which is a situation as (A), in the first instance, a to whether or not: Vaughn index has to be produced which compromises -and I think counsel as much said it, that the -- as we've said in our brief -- that this case involves a suicide.

I don't believe that even should have been provided, but last time when we were here and the

Court directed us to provide the <u>Vaughn</u> index, after counsel spoke among themselves on our option of offering them the opportunity to go into chambers and to listen, subject to a protective order, to what was on the recording. If they want to know what's on the recording of who is speaking, without us compromising the privacy expectations of the private citizens on that call, to me that's a way to avoid it. And counsel said no.

Why? Now we hear from Mr. Miller that he can't talk to his client about what's on it. Every day protective orders are entered in courts in this country involving trade secrets, involving a variety of things, where attorneys and courts deal with that situation. The fact that an attorney can't talk to his client at that time about the subject matter is dispositive of nothing in this case or those cases. Because the attorney can argue the position of their client, whether or not in this case, on balance, the interests that they're seeking to protect are greater than the privacy interests of the private citizens making the call in this case from their private residence.

It's not just the state that has an obligation to avoid invading the privacy of our

citizens. Private corporations, public corporations, individuals. We can't sacrifice our right of privacy based upon speculative and conjectural situations of cit --

THE COURT: You're not suggesting that because a private citizen calls for police assistance based on a burglary or a robbery, that that tape would be subject to privacy interest, are you?

Each case, Judge -- I don't MR, LEIBOWITZ: know, because each case depends on what's said and I can't say yes, I can't say no. what's heard. mean, the wire down in the street, the car accident, come, send the ambulance, what have you, in situations not involving personal matters. My neighbor's house has flames coming out of the roof, come and get it. don't have an issue of privacy that regard, Your In terms of a burglar, a mere burglar walking I probably don't have an issue, because I around? want to know how promptly the person handling the call gets the address, gets people out. I mean, sure, there's a concern there about whether the public dispatcher, the police officer mishandled the call. agree entirely.

Now that's where the Court comes in, in this case, and that's where we have to make the argument

that, in a case of personal privacy of a situation in this case, only the Court can decide whether or not --initially, at least, unless counsel wants to proceed pursuant to a protective order, where we sit together in camera to listen to it -- only the Court can decide, like Judge Serpentelli did, whether or not the privacy interests rise to the level of entitling the protection that the Prosecutor's Office has a responsibility to seek.

And we're talking about a constitutional obligation as well under the federal constitution, under the state constitution, besides OPRA itself, where <u>Burnett</u> indicates that there is a privacy protection that an agency has a responsibility to protect.

So I want to come back to the argument of the interest of whether it's the Latino Coalition, whether it's anybody who follows what goes on in the police shootings. If those generalized concerns are sufficient to eviscerate the privacy interest of private citizens in this particular case, if it is, then any speculation of that nat -- then -- then it means there's no privacy. Then it means that there's no entitlement of a person who has no option but to pick up the telephone and make a call and report that

a family member is in the process of attempting to commit suicide. That there's any protection for the distressed call of that individual.

And it's a sad day if it comes to that situation. And I respect the media's rights and interest to know whether there was a colorable negligence or misappropriation or mishandling by the public officials in this call, but that's where the Court, we submit, Your Honor, we believe, has to participate and that's a call that the Court has to make.

And I want to put on the record that on May 19th I got a call from co-defense counsel that the Court is looking for the unredacted recording. Just to indicate how that came about. We did not --

THE COURT: Yeah, I thought that I made that clear at the last hearing. The Prosecutor's Office received a request from the Court for that unredacted tape. Okay?

Now, I'll let you hear -- I'll let you respond to that, but go ahead.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: And with the speed with that unfolded, counsel was notified and the Court was provided with the unredacted recording, -THE COURT: Right.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: -- which we indicate at this point, Your Honor, that what is -- I mean, in terms of what we have produced as a <u>Vaughn</u> index and our reluctance to provide it, but we did, because the last time when we appeared before the Court, Your Honor It was a delicate directed us to provide it. balancing, if you will, in terms of still trying to protect the privacy interests, because we believe the people who are on these sections of the call are not police officers, they are not the public dispatcher, they are the private citizens who have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that, under the circumstances, when the Court listens to those, that there's not a colorable instance of misconduct or negligence by the responders.

And to that extent, we would submit and I believe that the Court plays a critical role in protecting the privacy interests therefore and balancing the interests of the media and the private citizens who have made this request and the individuals who are entitled to anonymity and who are entitled to solitude. That those very values of privacy are violated and lost if we have to go into the detail in a <u>Vaughn</u> index that counsel have argued from other distinguishable cases have to be provided

here. Okay?

I offer no apology for saying a family or household member appears in terms of a reference in that <u>Vaughn</u> index to have said something. I think perhaps -- you know, that's as far as privacy would permit us to go without saying Mary Smith or whoever the name of the person may have been said thus and such. Because the next thing you know, her privacy is going to be violated, because the media is going to be at her door asking her about the incident and if she has a privacy interest.

Only Your Honor, only the Court can protect her solitude and anonymity for what happened in this case. And the question is whether the segments that we have redacted, that the prosecutors have redacted, colorably fall within the concerns of the plaintiffs in this case. And we would just submit that, Your Honor, we rely upon the Court to address -- to decide that issue and, therefore, we make no apologies for the <u>Vaughn</u> index not having what counsel has sought. We feel it's our responsibility.

THE COURT: Okay. All right, counsel.

That's --

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Now, let me just talk about the procedure briefly, because I think that's a

somewhat of a critical issue, but now that the complaints have been filed, it's, in a manner of speaking, somewhat moot in this regard. Obviously, that has been included as a defense to the verified complaints.

And as I have read N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, which I believe is the section that says a requestor may initiate a proceeding under this Act, I thought about what that means and whether -- and I believe what that means, Your Honor, is it's characteristic in a lawsuit that's it's a requirement that a party bringing a suit has to make a demand for relief. Has to make a demand. In a collection case there has to be a bill that's provided, there has to be a demand for payment. If that's not made, a defense to a claim for payment can raise those.

It's our position that the language of the statute that's relied upon here simply indicates that a person can't simply initiate a lawsuit against a public agency for a document without making a demand for a document and without then the public agency responding. Which is what occurred here. However, where a constitutional, be it federal or state constitutional right of privacy is involved, the statute cannot operate as a bar to preclude some

relief being sought.

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Now, maybe a motion for a protective order procedurally should have been an order to show cause. Okay? Maybe it should have been a order for a declaratory judgment. But what I'm saying is, once a OPRA --

THE COURT: Or maybe it should have simply been a <u>Vaughn</u> index.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Well, here, given the privacy concerns, our position is that it -- we didn't provide a <u>Vaughn</u> index, a <u>Vaughn</u> index in this particular case was not -- I mean, it shouldn't have been requested, but the Court did. So while we have issue with that, if they got the <u>Vaughn</u> index that we provided -- and -- and part of the issue is how specific in a case involving privacy must a <u>Vaughn</u> index be? Judge Serpentelli didn't address that.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't want you to go back over that. I got that.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: So, I mean, procedurally our position -- and by the way, I do have to say, I mean, we did express in communication before the complaint was filed in response to the request for a <a href="Vaughn">Vaughn</a>

index that the privacy interests were such that a <u>Vaughn</u> index was not going to be provided. And then we followed with the letter and my certification to counsel saying, look, we'll agree to treat this situation as if under OPRA. You can get attorneys' fees if you prevail, but we offer as an option -- we --going into chambers with the Court and counsel listening to the recording. And we submit that that's a viable option to avoid all of this.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: To avoid the delay that the case has entailed, to avoid the unnecessary expense of filing a complaint. I mean, quite frankly, are we going to argue over who initiates bringing a protective order under the privacy interests of citizens who have constitutional rights over you have to wait until an opera complaint is filed -- an OPRA complaint is filed.

It's our position that this was a proactive approach to dealing with a problem that could have been resolved weeks, if not months ago, and we agreed to stipulate that if the plaintiffs prevailed, they would be entitled to attorneys' fees, just as if under OPRA. They would be entitled all rights just as if under OPRA. Our objective was not to deprive them of

attorneys' fees. It certainly could have efficiently expedited the matter and they could have gotten their attorneys' fees.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: So, I have to say that we regard that as a significant factor, which I put in my certification to the Court.

THE COURT: All right.

I -- if -- in terms of the MR. LEIBOWITZ: other arguments of counsel, look, the essence -- and this was argued more the first time that we didn't get a chance to respond, but the prosecutor's certification is such that basically the counsel is seeking the victims, the family members to provide certifications, because we know the prosecutor's certification has hearsay. But in order to protect the privacy interests of the individuals, we would submit that it's contrary to those interests to go to the individuals whose privacy -- private citizens the Prosecutor's Office is seeking to protect -- and say to them, you have to sign this certification so that the plaintiffs who want to hear your moments of distress on the recording don't get to hear it. mean, we find that totally inappropriate.

THE COURT: Or for the Court to review in

camera.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Well, I think that, again, it didn't seem that Judge Serpentelli required it and I am not familiar with any case that requires it where privacy is the issue. I think --

THE COURT: Mm-hmm. Okay.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: -- the privacy issue is one -- THE COURT: I got it.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: -- listen to the redacted portions. Determine whether, from the redacted portions, a -- the private citizens who are heard have a reasonable expectation of privacy. I think that merely signing a certification that somebody shoves under their nose and says, here, sign this, is really any better that the argument still could be made back and forth what does it matter that that person thinks they have a reasonable expectation of privacy; the media's interest should out balance that.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: That's for the Court to decide, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. MR. HARRIOTT: Yes, Your Honor. I'll be

brief.

I just want to start by apologizing to Ms.

Griffin for any confusion that may have been caused, because it's exactly the type of confusion that I feared would result when we had these multiple applications. I received the Wronko and Rivera matters first. When I was informed by Mr. Leibowitz that there were these three other pending matters, I reached out to everyone who is sitting here at the table today and suggested they all be heard at the same time, exactly because I had concerns about logistically or legally how the Court and the parties would sort this all out.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MR. HARRIOTT: When the Prosecutor's Office decided to release the redacted copy of the tape to the plaintiffs in the North Jersey Media and New Jersey -- or Home News Tribune and New Jersey Advance Media cases, I also had a copy of the redacted tape made for Ms. Griffin and sent to her. I will admit, Your Honor, in the aftermath of our last hearing on this case I did, in fact, neglect to have the Vaughn index, which was sent to me by Mr. Leibowitz, sent to Ms. Griffin, but I'd just like to represent that at no point was that intentional and I certainly apologize for that.

With respect to the applications, Judge --

Does she have it now? THE COURT: Go ahead. Okay.

MR. HARRIOTT: Judge, with respect to the applications, Your Honor accurately summarized our I will just add that, to the extent the arguments. records would not be considered criminal investigatory records, we'd ask the Court to also consider them as records of an ongoing investigation whose release would be inimicable to the public interest. believe that the certifications that were submitted by Mr. Crocco -- by Sergeant Crocco of the Prosecutor's Office and by Prosecutor Carey support the arguments. Sergeant Crocco's certification certainly supports the -- or establishes the existence of an ongoing investigation, which is currently being handled by the state Attorney General's Office.

It also, we would assert, adequately relays the security concerns that are in play in this case with respect to the certification of the prosecutor -of the prosecutor himself, which sets forth the privacy interests, we of course rely on the arguments that Mr. Leibowitz made already, but again would argue that the right of the citizens in this case to remain anonymous and to have their -- to not have their private information disclosed would outweigh the right

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of the public to know.

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It would be our position, I think as Mr. Leibowitz ably expressed, that the ability to review the government response on this tape, if that is the concern of the public, is still available even in a redacted form.

For -- so for those reasons, Your Honor, we believe that the response of the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office in all of these matters was appropriate and un (inaudible; voice drops off).

All right. Thank you, counsel. THE COURT:

All right. Any response?

MS. GRIFFIN: Yeah. Well, I just want to respond to that briefly to say I also do not have the prosecutor's certification that supposedly lays out how the ongoing investigation exemption had been met. What I do have is the Croc -- Sergeant Crocco certification, and all it says is that there was an investigation and that's not the standard. to prove there was an investigation that's ongoing, but you also have to prove that it would -- a release would be inimicable to the public interest.

And what the defendants argued in their brief does not meet the standards. They arqued impaneling a jury might be difficult. Courier News expressly said that is not a leg -- that is not a reason for applying the exemption. That there are procedural mechanisms at trial that you can use to counter that problem.

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They also argued that the -- any document that contains the name of an officer could create security problems in this climate of animosity towards police. That's speculative. They haven't pointed to any particular harm or threats of harm here in Middlesex County. And they also have already released the officer's name in the UFR, the officer that fired the shots, which we've -- which would presumably be the officer that would receive the most animosity from the public.

And they also have just made the blanket assertion that these are criminal investigatory records. I think we lay out pretty clearly that they are all required by law to be made. But again, there's just speculation throughout. The CAD reports. Those are reports that are required to be made. They are just recording the dispatch. And they just make this -- these general arguments and then they say they're likely to contain gruesome materials, but, you know, they haven't met their burden of proof, because they haven't demonstrated that they actually do. It

reads as if they haven't even looked at the records.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. GRIFFIN: As to the 9-1-1 call, again, I believe that my clients are so prejudiced by the lack of information and the lack of <u>Vaughn</u> index and the lack of the certifications that I can only rely upon the arguments of the other counsel here today.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. MR. MILLER: Yeah. Briefly, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MILLER: I just will go in reverse order of some of the arguments.

Just going to the protective order, counsel, Mr. Leibowitz suggested that, well, the OPRA statute kind of says the requestor may file suit, but it's unclear really who can file. Of course that's not the case. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 says, quote: "The right to institute any proceeding ... shall solely be [sic] that of the requestor." Close quote. So there is zero discretion there --

THE COURT: Next argument.

MR. MILLER: -- that -- and so we did, you know, Your Honor, send a letter under <u>Rule</u> 1:4-8 on that before this saying that was frivolous. It was frivolous then, it remains frivolous today.

THE COURT: Okay. MR. MILLER: They

MR. MILLER: They did not withdraw that.

I would also note counsel says, well, after we sent them a letter demanding they withdraw their frivolous application, they sent, in effect, a letter offering to compromise, let's let the Judge listen to it, which we rejected. Now, at best, that's an offer of compromise. That's under Rule of Evidence 408. That's -- that can't be used as evidence of anything, so I would submit that's entirely inappropriate to put that in a certification to Your Honor.

As far as the way by which the unredacted tape came into Your Honor's possession, again, that's all certainly news to me and my client. Even if Your Honor had made a request to the custodian to turn over the unredacted tape, the custodian should have and had a duty to at least notify all counsel of record that the tape was being turned over. Okay? To make an exparte submission without notice is highly improper and irregular, so, again, I object for the record.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MILLER: I would also respectfully submit that, for Your Honor to listen to the tape before we addressed the issue of the <u>Vaughn</u> index, was improper, because it kind of -- it jauntses [sic] Your

Honor's view, because you know what's on there. But, again, not to beat the dead horse, but we don't know what's on there and there's no way --

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MR. MILLER: -- we can know what's on there, so I would --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MILLER: -- just object to that

procedure.

It appears from the arguments that the prosecutor is making that they are trying to flip the burden now that it's up to us, it's up to the requestor to justify why we should have access to this record, but that's not how OPRA works. There is a presumption of public access to everything under OPRA, any exemptions are to be narrowly construed in favor of the public's right of access, and it is entirely the burden of the custodian to justify that one of these exemptions should apply. So it appears that we're now in a position of arguing why -- why this exemption shouldn't apply. It's not really our burden to do.

Also just to note, Your Honor, there are many ways that the prosecutor could have put in a legally adequate <u>Vaughn</u> index without getting into the

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ultimate issue of the, you know, disclosing their They could have put in a Doe affidavit from client. one of the purported --

> THE COURT: Sure.

-- people on the tape or one of MR. MILLER: purported family members. They did not do that.

And just to start off, Mr. Leibowitz's argument that this is such an exceptional case that, you know, you've got a 9-1-1 call, you can't possibly let this be turned over. For example, the Courier News case, which was -- that was the Jayson Williams That tape was held to That involved a shooting. be turned over by the Appellate Division. So the -so the idea that this is somehow extraordinary? not.

Almost any 9-1-1 call doesn't involve a cat stuck in a tree, it involves serious crimes, it involves death, it involves injury. And the courts have held that those tapes still should be turned over, because of the public's right to know. And, again, we have made clear the public interest is strong here.

> Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. CAFFERTY: Very briefly, Your Honor.

With respect to this preemptive application, the only thing I will say is that issue, the right of a custodian to initiate a proceeding either by virtue of declaratory judgment or in this case with a protective order, was soundly rejected -- and, unfortunately, I didn't know we would be arguing this issue -- by the California Supreme Court in a case Filarsky, F-I-L-A-R-S-K-I -- S-K-Y, and I'd be happy to provide counsel and the Court with that citation.

Thank you, counsel. THE COURT: All right. And -- and with respect to --MR. CAFFERTY: to -- Mr. Miller correctly notes -- and the prosecutor knows, because I've -- he knows how to do this, because I had it in another case involving Sayreville -- they could have submitted affidavits from these or certifications from these people, as Mr. Miller indicates, John Doe or initials.

> THE COURT: Okay.

Thank you, Your Honor. MR. CAFFERTY: All right. Thank you, counsel. THE COURT: Judge, just briefly and --MR. LEIBOWITZ: and -- and we disagree with what counsel said, enough is enough. However, if Your Court rules for disclosure, I have to request a stay of the ruling to permit the Prosecutor's Office --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me rule first and then you can make your stay -- request for the stay. Okay?

All right. Counsel, what I'd like for you to do -- I'm going to leave the bench just momentarily. I am going to give you a partial decision today on this protective order issue. I want you to serve counsel with a copy of the <u>Vaughn</u> index and the certification that she did not receive.

And, counsel, based on -- granted, it may be a <u>Vaughn</u> index that is not -- what you consider not to be satisfactory, I would like now to listen to the unredacted tape, so I can look at the particular sections of the <u>Vaughn</u> index and determine whether or not any of those should be turned over. Okay?

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Time wise, Judge, are you asking for that right now or are you going to -THE COURT: No, I am going to go in

chambers. You've got to exchange papers. I'm going to come back out, give you a decision on the protective order, and then, as long as I get that by this afternoon, I'll review it later on tonight and give you a decision tomorrow. Okay?

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Okay.

MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Recess from 10:20 a.m. to 10:31 a.m.) THE COURT: Be seated, guys. Okay. We're back on the record.

With regard to the motion for a protective order, the Court finds that the statute, the OPRA statute, Open Public Records Act, does not in any way provide or even suggest that such a proceeding would be appropriate with respect to protecting information that the governmental entity or the public entity believes should not be provided to the requestor based on a privacy interest. The statute and all of the associated case law creates a procedure for protecting what is otherwise exempted information or information that the entity might consider to be private by a means associated with the providing of a <u>Vaughn</u> index with an explanation as in the terms of why the information should not be provided.

The courts in New Jersey, while not binding on this Court, have held that the statute explicitly affords the right to the requestor for review, not the government. I would cite -- and these are unpublished decisions -- New [sic] Jersey Media Group versus Bergen County Prosecutor's Office, and Palisades Avenue Urban Renewal Corporation versus The Borough of Bogota at -- and that's a 2014 unpublished decision.

The court in <u>Bogota</u> noted that, quote, "If access to a government record is denied, the person denied access and only that person may challenge the decision." End of quote.

The Court finds no basis to depart from the clear language of the statute. The option of where to institute the action, the GRC or the Superior Court, and the option of whether to go to court at all are exclusively that of the requestor. The public entity cannot call individuals into court based on their own denial and then require those parties to expend legal fees in order to respond.

The motion for a protective order is procedurally defective pursuant to Rule 4:10-3, which is a rule basically of discovery. Motions for protective orders are intended to offer litigants a measure of privacy while balancing this privacy interest against the public's right to obtain information concerning judicial proceedings. Rule 4:10 is a rule utilized in the context of pretrial discovery, as the rule alerts us.

Accordingly, the Middlesex County Prosecutor's motion for a protective order is hereby denied.

Now, counsel, Ms. Griffin, would you

acknowledge that you've received the <u>Vaughn</u> index?

MS. GRIFFIN: Yes, I have received it.

THE COURT: Okay. Have you had the opportunity to review it?

MS. GRIFFIN: Yes, I looked at it and it -- I would like to reply -- rely upon the arguments of the other counsel.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. Okay.

MS. GRIFFIN: I also -- if I may, though, I
did also receive the certification that was submitted
in support of the protective order and I just want to
again note that I don't think it meets the
requirements -- it doesn't meet their burden of proof,
because it's treating the privacy provision as a
blanket exemption and -- and also treating the ongoing
investigation exemption as a blanket exemption, and
it's rely -- especially -- specific -- blah -specifically within the ongoing investigation
exemption, I notice that they're relying upon, you
know, these general concerns that have been repeatedly
struck down by the courts.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Now, counsel, I am posing this question to counsel for the government. In listening to this tape, now I am now looking to listen and identify

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where I am on the -- it's a disk -- by numbers. Do I need any type of special equipment or can I just put that in my computer and the numbers will come up?

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Let me just confirm --

THE COURT: I mean, do you need a 15-year-old to answer that question?

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Well, I might have to call somebody.

(Discussion among counsel, off the record.)

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Well, if you have the right player, the numbers should show up on your machine to follow the time and sequence.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Very good.
All right. Counsel, I will listen to it,
look at -- compare it to the numbers on the <u>Vaughn</u>
index. I'll give you my decision tomorrow. You're
certainly free to appear -- I know some of you are
coming from long distances -- or I'll give you the
option of appearing by telephone.

MR. HARRIOTT: Thank you.

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, just to be clear, you'll be reading something into the record tomorrow?

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. MILLER: Do you know a time certain, so I can check my calendar or that --

THE COURT: Yeah, at 1:30. MR. HARRIOTT: One thirty.

MR. LEIBOWITZ: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay.

MS. GRIFFIN: May I participate in that call, even though I am not subject to the -- to the --

THE COURT: Oh, sure.
MS. GRIFFIN: -- protective order?

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. CAFFERTY: I think we'll participate by telephone, if I may, Your Honor. I know I have a tax appeal hearing I have at 9:00, so --

THE COURT: Not a problem. It will probably

take --

MR. CAFFERTY: -- Ms. Lowy --

THE COURT: -- about 30 minutes to get it on

-- to put the entire --

MR. CAFFERTY: Okay.

THE COURT: -- decision on the record.

MR. CAFFERTY: All right.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll

let you know --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MILLER: -- if I'm going to be in person

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 or on the phone. I have something in Trenton I have to see if I can --

THE COURT: Notify my law clerk. Okay?
MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MS. GRIFFIN: Thank you.
(Hearing adjourned at 10:36 a.m.)

## CERTIFICATION

I, TERRY L. DeMARCO, the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on CourtSmart, Index Nos. from 9:09:22 to 10:36:48, is prepared to the best of my ability and in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate compressed transcript of the proceedings, as recorded.

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